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Perception and hierarchical dynamics
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In this paper, we suggest that perception could be modeled by assuming that sensory input is 
generated by a hierarchy of attractors in a dynamic system. We describe a mathematical model 
which exploits the temporal structure of rapid sensory dynamics to track the slower trajectories of 
their underlying causes. This model establishes a proof of concept that slowly changing neuronal 
states can encode the trajectories of faster sensory signals. We link this hierarchical account to 
recent developments in the perception of human action; in particular artifi cial speech recognition. 
We argue that these hierarchical models of dynamical systems are a plausible starting point 
to develop robust recognition schemes, because they capture critical temporal dependencies 
induced by deep hierarchical structure. We conclude by suggesting that a fruitful computational 
neuroscience approach may emerge from modeling perception as non-autonomous recognition 
dynamics enslaved by autonomous hierarchical dynamics in the sensorium.
Keywords: dynamic systems theory, recognition, perception, birdsong, speech, biological movement, environment, 
Bayesian inversion
The question we address in this paper is whether these develop-
ments in hierarchical, trajectory-based perception models point to 
a computational principle which can be implemented by the brain. 
In Kiebel et al. (2008) we developed a simple recognition system, 
based on a specifi c functional form of hierarchical dynamics. We 
reprise the approach here to show it affords schemes for perception 
that are both robust to noise and can represent deep hierarchical 
structure in the sensory streams.
We consider three constraints on perception that the brain has 
to contend with. The fi rst is that our environment and sensations 
are dynamic processes. This places computational demands on the 
speed of recognition and makes perception, at fi rst glance, more 
formidable than recognizing static scenes or objects. However, 
a dynamic environment has temporal structure and regu-
larities, which can be learned and may be benefi cial for robust 
perception.
The second constraint is that the brain performs perception 
online, because it has no access to future sensory input and can-
not store the details of past sensations (we assume here that the 
brain does not have the equivalent of computer memory, which 
could faithfully store the sensory stream for off-line processing). 
This means that transient sensory information must be used to 
represent the dynamic state of the environment. This constraint 
renders perception distinct from other analyses of time-series 
data, where timing is not critical and stored data can be analyzed 
off-line.
The third constraint is that we assume that the perception 
conforms to the free-energy principle (FEP); i.e., the percep-
tual system dynamically minimizes its free-energy and implicitly 
makes inferences about the causes of sensory input (Friston et al., 
2006). To minimize its free-energy, the agent uses a generative 
model of how the environment produces sensory input. This for-
mulation leads to the question ‘what generative model does the 
brain use?’ (Dayan et al., 1995; Lee and Mumford, 2003). Here, 
INTRODUCTION
Although there have been tremendous advances in the development 
of algorithms and devices that can extract meaningful informa-
tion from their environment, we seem still far away from building 
machines that perceive as robustly and as quickly as our brains. For 
example, in artifi cial speech recognition, Deng et al. (2006) sum-
marize current technology with: ‘The machine would easily break if 
the users were to speak in a casual and natural style as if they were 
talking with a friend.’ The situation is similar in machine vision: 
Although highly specialized recognition devices exist; e.g., for face 
recognition (Tan et al., 2006; Zhao et al., 2003), there is no generally 
accepted computational principle for robust perception.
In artifi cial speech recognition, the conventional approach is to 
approximate the acoustic expression of speech by hidden Markov 
models (Bilmes, 2006; O’Shaughnessy, 2008). This scheme and 
its variants do not seem, by construction, to capture effi ciently 
the long-range temporal and contextual dependencies in speech 
(O’Shaughnessy, 2008). However, a novel approach is emerging 
that suggests a fundamental computational principle: the idea is 
to model fast acoustic features of speech as the expression of com-
paratively slow articulator movement (Deng et al., 2006; King et al., 
2007; McDermott and Nakamura, 2006). These models describe 
speech as a hierarchy of dynamic systems, where the lowest (fastest) 
level generates auditory output. Although this approach, due to its 
complexity, is still at an early stage of development, the premise 
is that hierarchical dynamics may provide valuable constraints on 
speech recognition. These could make artifi cial speech recogni-
tion systems more robust, in relation to conventional approaches, 
which do not embody hierarchical constraints effi ciently. In the 
visual domain, similar hierarchical models have been considered for 
making inference on dynamic human behavior, such as those used 
in robot-human interaction or surveillance technology (Kruger 
et al., 2007; Moeslund et al., 2006; Oliver et al., 2004; Robertson 
and Reid, 2006; Saenko et al., 2005; Yam et al., 2004).
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we will review and discuss a hierarchical model for perception, 
where higher levels (further away from sensory input) encode 
the shape of attractors which contain faster, lower level dynamics 
(Kiebel et al., 2008). Previously we have shown in simulations, 
that this hierarchical model enables agents to recognize states 
causing sensory input, at two time scales. In this paper, we focus 
on the implications of hierarchical attractor models for arti-
fi cial agents, for example speech recognition devices, and real 
brains. In particular, we introduce neurocomputational models 
of perception that emerge when one describes the dynamics of 
two systems (the environment and the agent) that are coupled 
via sensory input.
THEORY
In the following, we summarize a generative model based on a 
hierarchy of attractors and its variational inversion. In Kiebel et al. 
(2008), we used simulations to show that the inversion of these 
models shows a range of features which reproduce experimental 
fi ndings in systems neuroscience. Here, we relate this model to 
research in artifi cial speech recognition.
A MODEL OF PERCEPTUAL INFERENCE
Human speech perception has been construed as the output of a 
multi-level hierarchical system, which must be decoded at different 
time-scales (Chater and Manning, 2006; Poeppel et al., 2008). For 
example, while a spoken sentence might only last for seconds, it 
also conveys information about the speaker’s intent (an important 
environmental cause) that persists over much longer time-scales. 
To illustrate these points, we will simulate the recognition of bird-
songs. We use this avian example to illustrate that communica-
tion entails (i) embedding information at various time-scales into 
sound-waves at a fast time-scale and (ii) that the recipient must 
invert a hierarchical dynamic model to recover this information. 
Our objective is to show that communication can be implemented 
using hierarchical models with separation of temporal scales. In 
the following, we describe a two-level system that can generate 
sonograms of synthetic birdsong and serves as a generative model 
for perception of these songs.
There is a large body of theoretical and experimental evidence 
that birdsongs are generated by dynamic, nonlinear and hierar-
chical systems (Glaze and Troyer, 2006; Sen et al., 2001; Vu et al., 
1994; Yu and Margoliash, 1996). Birdsong contains information 
that other birds use for decoding information about the singing 
bird. It is unclear which features birds use to extract this informa-
tion; however, whatever these features are, they are embedded in 
the song, at different time-scales. For example, at a long time-scale, 
another bird might simply register the duration of a song, which 
might belie the bird’s fi tness. At short time-scales, the amplitude 
and frequency spectrum of the song might refl ect attributes of the 
bird or imminent danger.
A GENERATIVE BIRDSONG MODEL
In Kiebel et al. (2008), we described a system of two coupled Lorenz 
attractors, whose output was used to construct a sonogram and 
associated sound wave, which sounds like a series of chirps. The key 
point of this model is that, when generating output, the states of 
a Lorenz attractor at a slower time scale act as control parameters 
for another Lorenz attractor at a faster time scale. The model can 
be expressed as


x f x v T w
v x z
x f x v
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
, ,
,
2 2 2 2 2
1
3
2 2
1 1
4
= ( ) +
= − +
=
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )
,1 1 1
2
1
3
1
1
T w
y
x
x
z
( ) +
=
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
+
 
(1)
where, v(i) represent inputs to level i (or outputs from level i + 1), 
which perturb the possibly autonomous dynamics among that lev-
el’s states x(i). The nonlinear function f encodes the equations of 
motion of the Lorenz system:
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For both levels, we used a = 10 (the Prandtl number) and c = 8/3. 
The parameter T controls the speed at which the Lorenz attractor 
evolves; here we used T(1) = 0.25 s and T(2) = 2 s; so that the dynam-
ics at the second level are an order of magnitude slower than at the 
fi rst. At the second-level we used a Rayleigh number; v(2) = 32. We 
coupled the fast to the slow system by making the output of the slow 
system ν( ) ( )1 3
2 4= −x  the Rayleigh number of the fast system. The 
Rayleigh number is effectively a control parameter that determines 
whether the autonomous dynamics supported by the attractor are 
fi xed point, quasi-periodic or chaotic (the famous butterfl y shaped 
attractor). The sensory signals generated are denoted by y, which 
comprises the second and third state of x(1) (Eq. 1). We will call the 
vectors x(i) hidden states, and the scalar v(1) the causal state, where 
superscripts indicate model level and subscripts refer to elements. 
At each level we modeled Gaussian noise on the causes and states 
(w(i) and z(i)) with a log-precision (inverse variance), of eight (except 
for observation noise z(1), which was unity). We constructed the son-
ogram (describing the amplitude and frequency of the birdsong) 
by making y1  the amplitude and y2 the frequency (scaled to cover a 
spectrum between 2 and 5 kHz). Acoustic time-series (which can be 
played) are constructed by an inverse windowed Fourier transform. 
An example of the system’s dynamics and the ensuing sonogram 
are shown in Figures 2A,B. The software producing (and playing) 
these dynamics and the sonogram can be downloaded as Matlab 
7.7 (Mathworks) code (see software note).
This model can be regarded as a generative or forward model 
that maps states of the singing bird to sensory consequences (i.e., 
the sonogram). For human listeners, the resulting song sounds 
like a real birdsong. Given a generative model of birdsong, we can 
generate (different) songs and ask: How could a synthetic bird 
recognize these songs?
The online inversion of this forward model; i.e., the online 
reconstruction of the hidden and causal states, corresponds to per-
ception or mapping from the sonogram to the underlying states 
of the singing bird. In this example, perception involves the online 
estimation of states at the fast and slow level. Although, at the 
fast fi rst-level, two of the states (those controlling amplitude and 
frequency of the acoustic input) are accessed easily, the third x1
1( ) 
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describes a completely hidden trajectory. It is important to estimate 
this state correctly because it determines the dynamics of the others 
(see Eq. 2). Model inversion also allows the listening bird to perceive 
the slowly varying hidden states at the second level, x(2), which can-
not be heard directly but must be inferred from fast sensory input. 
The second-level hidden states encode the high-order structure of 
the song by specifying the shape of the attractor at the fi rst level. The 
ensuing inversion problem is diffi cult to solve because the bird can 
only infer states at both levels through the nonlinear, continuous 
and stochastic dynamics of the Lorenz attractor at the fi rst level.
PERCEPTION USING VARIATIONAL INVERSION
In Kiebel et al. (2008), we showed how inversion of this hierarchical 
model can be implemented using the free-energy principle (Friston 
et al., 2006). This variational online inversion can be conceptualized as 
shown in Figure 1. The environment, here a synthetic bird, generates 
output using a hierarchical system with coupled slow and fast dynam-
ics (Eqs 1 and 2). This generates sensory input that is recognized by 
the receiving bird. It does this by passing top-down messages (predic-
tions) and bottom-up messages (prediction errors) between the levels 
of its generative model. When top-down messages from the fi rst level 
predict sensory input, the hidden and causal states of the generative 
model become representations of the corresponding states of the 
singing bird and perceptual inference is complete. For mathematical 
details, we refer the interested reader to Friston et al. (2008).
SIMULATIONS OF BIRDSONG PERCEPTION
Here, we describe the result of a single simulation to show that 
the online inversion can successfully recognize songs and track 
the  trajectories of the states at all levels. In Friston and Kiebel 
(2009) and Kiebel et al. (2008) we present more simulations, and 
discuss and relate them to perception, categorization and omission 
responses in the brain. In Figure 2A we plot the hidden and causal 
states, which produce sensory output corresponding to synthetic 
birdsong generation. One can see immediately that the two levels 
have different time-scales due to their different rate constants (Eqs 1 
and 2). The resulting sonogram is shown in Figure 2B.
The results of online inversion (i.e., song recognition) are shown 
in Figure 3. At the fi rst level, the uncertainty about the states was 
small, as indicated by narrow 90% confi dence intervals, shown in 
grey. At the second level, the system tracks the hidden and causal 
states veridically. However, as these variables are inferred through 
the sensory data, uncertainty about the hidden state reaches, inter-
mittently, high values. The uncertainty about the hidden states at 
the second-level is very high, because these variables can only be 
inferred via the causal state v(1). In particular, note the increased 
period of uncertainty at about 0.3 s, at both levels. This uncertainty 
is caused by the hidden state of the fi rst-level switching between the 
‘wings’ of the Lorenz attractor. At this point, the hidden state at the 
fi rst level is less identifi able than when it is on the outer reaches of 
a wing. This is because of nonlinearities in the generative model, 
which mean, at this point, the motion of the state is a weaker func-
tion of the states per se. This uncertainty (i.e., will the state cross to 
the other wing or not?) is part of inference.
In summary, these results show that the hierarchical model can 
not only generate birdsong dynamics but, using the free-energy 
principle, it can be used as a generative model to decode incoming 
sensory input with relatively high precision. Critically, at the second 
level, the decoding (listening) bird infers hidden states that evolve 
slowly over time. This is an important result because the values of 
the hidden states at the second level specify the attractor manifold, 
and therefore the trajectory of states at the fi rst. In other words, 
one location in state space at the higher level specifi es a sequence of 
states at the lower. Moreover, because the states at the second level 
also follow a slowly varying trajectory, the attractor manifold at the 
fi rst level keeps changing slowly over time. It is this slow modula-
tion of the fi rst-level manifold that expresses itself in the variations 
of the fast moving fi rst-level state, which enable the perception to 
track hidden trajectories at the second level.
A key aspect of this model rests on the nonlinearity of the genera-
tive model. This is because the only way for slowly varying causes 
to be expressed as faster consequences is through nonlinear mecha-
nisms (Eq. 2). It is this nonlinearity that allows high-level states to act 
as control parameters to reconfi gure the motion of faster low-level 
states. If the equations of motion at each level were linear in the 
states, each level would simply convolve its supraordinate inputs 
with an impulse response function. This precludes the induction 
of faster dynamics because linear convolutions can only suppress 
various frequencies. However, the environment is nonlinear, where 
long-term causes may disclose themselves through their infl uence on 
the dynamics of other systems. To predict the ensuing environmen-
tal trajectories accurately, top-down effects in the agent’s genera-
tive model must be nonlinear too. We suggest that this principle of 
separation of time scales in a nonlinear hierarchy is not only used in 
avian but also in human communication, because both birdsong and 
speech share the common feature that information is transmitted 
FIGURE 1 | Birdsong generation and its recognition using variational 
inversion. Environment (left): In this two-level birdsong model, sonograms are 
generated by the autonomous, coupled dynamics of two Lorenz attractors 
(see Eqs 1 and 2). The states of the fi rst Lorenz attractor evolve at a slow time 
scale and act as control parameters for the faster Lorenz attractor. Perception 
system (right): The implicit variational dynamic inversion is a recurrent 
message passing scheme, where top-down predictions are sent from the 
slow level to the fast level, while the fast level receives sensory input and 
generates bottom-up prediction errors. The resulting recognition dynamics are 
non-autonomous and try to ‘mirror’ the environmental dynamics.
Frontiers in Neuroinformatics www.frontiersin.org July 2009 | Volume 3 | Article 20 | 4
Kiebel et al. Perception and hierarchical dynamics
via rapidly modulated sound waves. In the following, we will review 
evidence which suggests that human speech can be appropriately 
modeled and recognized by a hierarchy of attractors.
ARTIFICIAL SPEECH RECOGNITION
How are our simulations related to artifi cial perception systems 
that solve ‘real-world’ recognition tasks? Here, we focus on artifi cial 
speech recognition (ASR) but note that there are similar mod-
eling initiatives in other areas of artifi cial perception; e.g., vision 
(Moeslund et al., 2006; Oliver et al., 2004; Yam et al., 2004).
An intuitive approach to speech recognition is to consider speech 
as a sequence of phonemes; i.e., speech sounds are like ‘beads on a 
string’, which form syllables, words and sentences (Ostendorf, 1999). 
The idea here is that when one knows the ‘single beads’, one just needs 
to read out the sentence. This intuition leads naturally to models 
that treat speech as a sequence of states, which can be recognized, 
given the auditory input, using hidden Markov models (Bilmes, 
2006; O’Shaughnessy, 2008). However, speech does not seem to work 
like this: Speech exhibits all kinds of contextual effects, at various 
time-scales, leading to cross-temporal dependencies. For example, 
co-articulation induces a dependence of the acoustic expression of 
speech-sounds on the sound’s temporal neighbors (Browman and 
Goldstein, 1992). These temporal dependencies introduce a tremen-
dous amount of variations in the ‘single beads’. In  conventional  hidden 
Markov models these can be modeled by increasing the number of 
states and parameters, which can lead to serious model identifi cation 
issues: Various reviews discuss why the hidden Markov model and its 
extensions, as conventionally used in ASR, are probably not appro-
priate to model and recognize speech with human-like performance 
(Bilmes, 2006; King et al., 2007; O’Shaughnessy, 2008).
Although ignored as a main-stream modeling assumption in the 
ASR fi eld, the acoustic stream is the consequence of hidden state-
space trajectories: the vocal tract (VT) dynamics, i.e. tongue, mouth 
and lips and other VT components, generate articulatory gestures, 
which are understood to be the basic elements of speech (Browman 
and Goldstein, 1997; Deng et al., 2006; Liberman and Whalen, 2000; 
McDermott and Nakamura, 2006). A novel modeling approach, 
which seems to be emerging from the ASR fi eld, focuses on two cru-
cial points: First, the specifi cation of a generative hierarchical speech 
model for recognition, which models VT dynamics as hidden tra-
jectories. Second, these VT dynamics form speech ‘gestures’, whose 
perception is the goal of artifi cial speech recognition. There are many 
interesting variants of this approach, e.g. (Deng et al., 2006, 2007; Hofe 
and Moore, 2008; King et al., 2007; Livescu et al., 2007; McDermott 
and Nakamura, 2006; Rose et al., 1996; Saenko et al., 2005).
Such hierarchical generative models place fast acoustics at the 
lowest level, whereas (various levels of) VT dynamics causing 
the acoustics through top-down infl uences (Deng et al., 2006). 
FIGURE 2 | Data and states, over 2 s, generated by a two-level 
birdsong model. (A) At the fi rst level, there are two outputs (i.e., sensory 
data) (left: blue and green solid line) and three hidden states of a Lorenz attractor 
(right: blue, green, and red solid line). The second level is also a Lorenz attractor 
that evolves at a time-scale that is one magnitude slower than the fi rst. At 
the second level, the causal state (left: blue solid line) serves as control 
parameter (Rayleigh number) of the fi rst-level attractor, and is governed by the 
hidden states at the second level (right: blue, green, and red solid line). The 
red dotted lines (top left) indicate the observation error on the output. 
(B) Sonogram (time-frequency representation) constructed from 
model output. High intensities represent time-frequency locations with greater 
power.
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Importantly, VT dynamics tend to be slower than the changes in 
acoustics they cause and the function which maps VT to acous-
tic dynamics can be highly nonlinear. Naturally, development of 
these generative models is slow because of their complexity and 
the ongoing development of novel schemes for inverting dynamic 
nonlinear hierarchical models. It may be that recent developments 
(Friston et al., 2008) in the inversion of these models, particularly 
in a neurobiological setting (Friston, 2008a), may play a useful role 
in the recognition of generative speech models used in ASR.
DISCUSSION
We have suggested that a simple model of birdsong perception, 
motivated by computational neuroscience and ongoing devel-
opments in artifi cial speech recognition share a critical feature: 
Generative models for human and avian communication seem to 
be based on a hierarchy of dynamical systems, where high levels 
display slow variations and provide contextual guidance for lower 
faster levels. The principle of hierarchical inference, using appropri-
ate inversion schemes, with separation of time-scales, could be an 
inherent part of the computations that underlie successful artifi cial 
recognition of human action and behavior.
A hierarchical inference has several implications for cortical 
structure as well as for artifi cial and human perception. For corti-
cal structure, these are:
• Cortical areas are organized hierarchically (Felleman and Van 
Essen, 1991; Fuster, 2004).
• Macroscopic neuroanatomy recapitulates hierarchical sepa-
ration of time-scales; see Kiebel et al. (2008) for a discussion 
of the evidence that the cortex is organized as an anatomic-
 temporal hierarchy.
• Extrinsic forward connections convey prediction error (from 
superfi cial pyramidal cells) and backward connections mediate 
predictions, based on hidden and causal states (from deep 
pyramidal cells) (Friston, 2005; Mumford, 1992; Sherman and 
Guillery, 1998).
In the following we discuss the implications for artifi cial and 
human perception.
A COMPUTATIONAL PRINCIPLE FOR PERCEPTION
The conjecture that the brain inverts hierarchical generative models 
may lead to a deeper understanding of the computational principles 
FIGURE 3 | Dynamic online inversion of the data presented in Figure 2. 
Observed data (see Figure 2) are now shown as black, dotted lines, and the 
model predictions as solid, coloured lines. The 90% confi dence interval 
around the conditional means is shown in grey. The prediction error (i.e. 
difference between observation and model prediction) is indicated by red 
dotted lines.
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behind perception. As described above, a hierarchical approach 
has also been adopted in the engineering and artifi cial perception 
literature (Deng et al., 2006; Kim et al., 2008; Moeslund et al., 2006; 
Yam et al., 2004). It is worth noting that these developments seem 
to have made minimal reference to neuroscience but were driven 
by the insight that conventional non-hierarchical models do not 
capture the deep hierarchical structure of sensory data (Bilmes, 
2006; Deng et al., 2006; Oliver et al., 2004).
What are the advantages and disadvantages of using hierarchical 
models as the basis of artifi cial perception? A clear disadvantage 
is that, for real-world applications like speech recognition, the 
dynamics of movements may take complicated forms, at various 
time scales. It is therefore not surprising that the best working solu-
tions for artifi cial speech recognition rather rely on  learning large 
 numbers of free parameters in less constrained models (McDermott 
and Nakamura, 2006). In addition, the inversion of nonlinear sto-
chastic hierarchical dynamic models is a non-trivial challenge 
(Budhiraja et al., 2007; Friston et al., 2008; Judd and Smith, 2004). 
However, in principle, hierarchical dynamics can be parameterized 
by rather low-dimensional systems, in comparison to the high-
dimensional sensory stream. This means that relatively few param-
eters are required to track acoustic trajectories. This might make 
dynamic speech identifi able, leading to robust perception schemes. 
Interestingly, for speech, prior research has already investigated 
the dynamics of articulation but is embraced with reluctance by 
the artifi cial speech recognition fi eld (McDermott and Nakamura, 
2006).
A hierarchical model may also be useful in robust perception 
of motor behavior, because human movements seem to be more 
invariant than the sensory features which they cause (Todorov 
and Jordan, 2002). This means that movements, which are on a 
comparatively slower time-scale than their sensory expressions, 
may be expressed naturally at a higher level in hierarchical models. 
This is consistent with neuroscience fi ndings that higher cortical 
levels show invariance over greater time scales than lower levels 
(Giese and Poggio, 2003; Hasson et al., 2008; Koechlin and Jubault, 
2006). Furthermore, the relative slowness of human movements, in 
comparison to consequent variations in the sensory stream, may 
also enable the prediction of fast sensory features, increasing the 
robustness of perception (King et al., 2007; Yam et al., 2004). We 
have demonstrated this by showing that a hierarchical scheme can 
out-perform a non-hierarchical scheme, see Figure 5 in Kiebel et al. 
(2008).
In addition, speech trajectories could be modelled at time-scales 
beyond single speech-sounds and syllables, e.g. covering words and 
sentences. At this level, long-range hierarchical and cross- temporal 
dependencies are subject of active research in computational lin-
guistics and natural language (Bengio et al., 2003; Huyck, 2009; 
Smits, 2001). The inversion of models with temporal hierarchies 
may provide a framework for computational models of language 
processing. For example, they are in a position to explain how 
uncertainty about the meaning of the early part of a sentence is 
resolved on hearing the end: i.e., increases in conditional certainty 
about hidden states, based on current sensory input confi rms 
their predictions. In other words, the long-range or deep tempo-
ral dependencies in speech might lend themselves to hierarchical 
temporal modelling. The resulting inference, using serial speech 
input, may appear to be non-serial because decisive evidence for 
hidden states at different levels arrives at different times. To our 
knowledge, a fully dynamical hierarchical scheme that maps from 
sound waves to the semantics is still beyond the current abilities 
of artifi cial speech recognition (Deng et al., 2006).
SIMPLE NETWORK OPERATIONS
Although the variational inversion of hierarchical dynamic mod-
els might appear too unwieldy for a simple theory of perception, 
the actual operations needed to implement recognition dynam-
ics are rather simple (Friston et al., 2008). By ‘simple’ we mean 
that all operations are instantaneous and just involve message-
passing among neurons in a network and associative plasticity of 
their connections. This renders the approach neurobiologically 
plausible. The message-passing scheme is not the only possible 
 implementation, there may be others, each with their own approxi-
mations and simplifi cations to compute the free energy. Irrespective 
of the optimization scheme used, the requisite update equations 
are determined by the generative model, which is specifi ed by the 
likelihood and priors. This means that the identifi cation of the 
brain’s generative model of the environment is the key to under-
standing perception (Friston, 2008a; Rao and Ballard, 1999; Yuille 
and Kersten, 2006).
The variational inversion using generative models is just a recipe 
to construct a system of differential equations, which recognize 
sensory input, i.e., optimise a free-energy bound on the log evidence 
for some model. This means the scheme shares many formal simi-
larities with dynamical systems used in computational neuroscience 
to describe neuronal systems (Rabinovich et al., 2006). As noted by 
one of our reviewers, it may be that such schemes have evolved to 
exploit natural or universal phenomena that appear when dynami-
cal systems are coupled (Breakspear and Stam, 2005). Indeed, in an 
evolutionary setting, the emergence of effi cient coupled dynamical 
systems that optimise free-energy may exploit these phenomena. 
For example, coupled nonlinear systems naturally evolve towards 
a synchronous state, even with relatively weak coupling. It would 
be very interesting if these synchronised states could be associated 
with optimised free-energy states that are mandated by perception 
in particular and the free-energy principle in general.
In short, the variational approach entails fi nding a dynamic 
system (the generative model), which describes the generation 
of sensory input. Variational learning principles are then applied 
to derive differential equations, which decode hidden states from 
sensory input. The use of generic inversion systems as proposed 
in Friston et al. (2008) enables one to focus on the fi rst challenge, 
which may be informed by the study of coupled dynamical systems, 
in a more general setting.
COUPLING BETWEEN TIME-SCALES
The variational inversion of temporal hierarchies describes how 
fast sensory input can infl uence inferred states at slow time-scales. 
There are recent studies that suggest this sort of coupling may be 
a generic feature of coupled dynamical systems: Fujimoto and 
Kaneko describe how to exploit a bifurcation cascade to couple 
slow high-level states to fast low-level dynamics. Crucially, they 
fi nd that coupling is seen only in a narrow regime of time-scale 
ratios, around two to three (Fujimoto and Kaneko, 2003a,b). 
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As shown in Kiebel et al. (2008), dynamical systems based on 
 variational inversion schemes operate in a broader regime: one 
can construct systems where fast dynamics infl uence slow dynam-
ics at much higher time-scale ratios. In the present work, we use a 
ratio of eight, which is beyond the limit identifi ed by Fujimoto and 
Kaneko (2003b). However, dynamics based on variational inver-
sion have a natural lower limit on the time-scale ratio: When the 
ratio approaches one, the changes in the manifold of the fast sys-
tem, caused by the slow system, evolve nearly as fast as the states 
themselves. This means that the changes in the manifold cannot 
be separated from the dynamics of the states. This suggests that 
robust inversion of temporal hierarchies rests on a separation of 
temporal scales, which may impose a lower bound on the relative 
time-scales.
Although we have not emphasized it in this paper, the fact that 
one can formulate the inversion of dynamic models with deep or 
hierarchical temporal structure as a dynamical system rests on recent 
technical advances in Bayesian fi ltering (Friston, 2008b; Friston 
et al., 2008). In brief, these advances use generalised coordinates of 
motion to represent the trajectories of hidden states. Generalised 
coordinates cover position, velocity acceleration etc. Although this 
increases the number of implicit hidden states it greatly simplifi es 
inversion, in comparison with conventional schemes like particle 
and extended Kalman fi ltering. This simplifi cation reduces fi ltering 
(i.e., inversion) to a gradient descent, which can be implemented 
in a neurobiologically plausible fashion. The use of generalised 
coordinates is formally similar to temporal embedding in the char-
acterisation of dynamical systems: Taken’s theorem (Takens, 1981) 
states that it is possible to embed (i.e. geometrically represent) the 
structure of a vector-fi eld in a higher dimensional space. This means 
that one can reconstruct the structure of the manifold, on which 
dynamics unfold, by using a Taylor expansion of the vector-fi eld. 
This is very close to the idea of projecting the system into general-
ized coordinates. In essence, this projection allows the observer to 
encode the structure of the fl ow-fi eld at each point in time.
A GENERAL MECHANISM FOR PERCEPTION AND ACTION IN THE BRAIN?
In a recent paper, we reviewed some compelling experimental 
 evidence for temporal hierarchies in the brain. We argued that 
these hierarchies may refl ect a general form of generative models 
that the brain uses to recognize causes beyond the temporal support 
of elemental percepts (e.g., formants in audition and biological 
motion in vision, Kiebel et al., 2008). We have shown previously 
that the inversion of these generative models lead to robust and 
accurate inferences about the causes of sensory input. Hierarchical 
models are approximations to the environmental processes that 
generate sensory data (Todorov et al., 2005); so one might ask 
why evolution selected temporal hierarchies? Intuitively, there is 
something fundamentally correct about generative models based 
on temporal hierarchies; in the sense that the content of our sen-
sorium changes more quickly than its context. However, for com-
munication and biological motion there may be additional reasons 
to suppose temporal hierarchies afford just the right model; this is 
because our brains may use the same architecture to generate and 
recognise movements (Kilner et al., 2007). This means that, during 
co-evolution with our conspecifi cs, temporal hierarchies may have 
been subject to selective pressure, precisely because they enable 
generation and recognition of communicative stimuli over multiple 
time-scales (i.e., with deep temporal structure) (Rauschecker and 
Scott, 2009; von Kriegstein et al., 2008).
PERCEPTION MIRRORS THE ENVIRONMENT
The role of non-autonomous recognition dynamics is to mirror or 
track autonomous dynamics in the environment. If this tracking 
is successful, the recognition system ‘inherits’ the dynamics of the 
environment and can predict its sensory products accurately. This 
inheritance is lost when the sensory input becomes surprising, i.e. 
is not predicted by perception. In this case, the recognition system 
uses prediction error to change the predictions and make sensory 
input unsurprising again. This heuristic explains how the agent’s 
dynamics manage to switch rapidly between different attractor 
regimes. This switching, e.g. see Figure 3 in Kiebel et al. (2008), 
is caused by the interplay between the system’s attempt to mini-
mize surprise (which is bounded by free-energy) and (surprising) 
sensory input.
IDENTIFICATION OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL MODEL
Explicit modeling of environmental dynamics and their inversion 
may be a useful approach to model perception for several rea-
sons: most current research in computational neuroscience focuses 
on modeling a single neuronal system, which generates neuronal 
dynamics just as the brain does. This ‘single system’ approach, 
which does not model the environmental dynamics explicitly, is 
very useful for identifying neuronal mechanisms and relating them 
to applied sensory input and neuronal or behavioral observations 
(Rabinovich et al., 2006). However, this approach does not address 
how these neuronal mechanisms (and not others) come about in 
the fi rst place.
An alternative approach may be to model neuronal dynamics 
‘from scratch’: Such a full forward model would comprise three 
components: (i) A model of the environment with autonomous 
dynamics, which, using the free-energy principle, prescribes (ii) 
non-autonomous recognition dynamics, which are implemented 
by (iii) neuronal dynamics (Figure 4, left panel). In other words, 
appropriate models of the environment may be requisite to make 
strong predictions about observed neuronal dynamics. Given the 
complexity and detail of neuronal dynamics, one might argue 
that the identifi cation of appropriate environmental models is a 
daunting task. However, the ‘dual-system’ approach of modeling 
both environment and the brain would essentially rephrase the 
question ‘How does the brain work?’ to ‘What is a good model of 
the environment that discloses how the brain works?’ (see, e.g., 
Chiel and Beer, 1997; Proekt et al., 2008). This approach has the 
advantage that environmental models, which cannot be inverted, 
disqualify themselves and are unlikely to be used as generative 
models by the brain. For example, in artifi cial speech recognition, 
the conventional hidden Markov model has been found diffi cult to 
invert for casual speech. Moreover, this model is also a poor gen-
erative model of speech, i.e. speech generated by this model yields 
barely intelligible speech (McDermott and Nakamura, 2006). 
Given that one can identify appropriate models of the environ-
ment; e.g., for audiovisual speech, the recognition performance 
can be directly compared to human performance. Furthermore, 
one could use established model selection schemes to evaluate 
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environmental models in the context of their  neuronal inversion 
(Friston et al., 2008). This dual-system modeling approach may 
also allow one to ask whether simulated recognition produces 
the same kind of predictions and prediction errors as humans, 
e.g. when exposed to sensory input that induces the McGurk 
effect (Cosker et al., 2005). Such experiments would enable us 
to explain the McGurk effect and similar perception phenomena 
in a causal fashion, as the consequence of our brains’ generative 
environmental model. In addition, one may be able to couple 
simulated recognition dynamics with models of neuronal dynam-
ics and relate these to observed neuronal dynamics (Figure 4, 
right). This would enable us to make predictions about observed 
neuronal responses under specifi c assumptions about the gen-
erative model used by the brain, and how neuronal dynamics 
implement recognition.
The value of this dual-system approach is that neuroscience 
and artifi cial perception have a common interest in these models 
(Scharenborg, 2007). Not only would such an integrative approach 
provide a constructive account of brain function, at multiple levels 
of description, but also enable machines to do real-world tasks, (see, 
e.g., Rucci et al., 2007) for a spatial localization example at the inter-
face between artifi cial perception, robotics and neuroscience.
CONCLUSIONS
We have demonstrated that the recognition of environmental 
causes from sensory input can be modeled as the inversion of 
dynamic, nonlinear, hierarchical, stochastic models. We have 
discussed relevant developments in artifi cial perception, which 
suggest that perception models the environment as a hierarchy 
of autonomous systems, evolving at various time-scales, to gen-
erate sensory input. In this view, the computational principles of 
perception may be accessed by considering variational inversion 
of these models.
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
All procedures described in this note have been implemented as 
Matlab (MathWorks) code. The source code is freely available in 
the Dynamic Expectation Maximization (DEM) toolbox of the 
Statistical Parametric Mapping package (SPM8) at http://www.fi l.
ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/.
FIGURE 4 | Modeling neuronal dynamics caused by environmental 
dynamics. Brain system (left): In this dual-system model, neuronal dynamics 
(bottom) correspond to inversion or recognition dynamics (middle) induced by 
environmental dynamics (top). We assume that the environmental and 
neuronal dynamics can be partially observed, while the recognition dynamics 
are hidden. Simulated system (right): The full generative model of neuronal 
dynamics; starting with environmental dynamics, which specify recognition 
dynamics, which predict neuronal dynamics.
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